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Regular annuities provide payment for the duration of an owner’s lifetime. Period-Certain 
annuities provide additional payment after death to a beneficiary provided the insured dies 
within a certain period after annuitization. It has been argued that the bequest option offered 
by the latter is dominated by life insurance which provides non-random bequests. This is 
correct if competitive annuity and life insurance markets have full information about 
individual longevities. In contrast, this paper shows that when individual longevities are 
private information, a competitive pooling equilibrium which offers annuities at common 
prices to all individuals may have positive amounts of both types of annuities in addition to 
life insurance. In this equilibrium, individuals self-select the types of annuities that they 
purchase according to their longevity prospects. The break-even price of each type of annuity 
reflects the average longevity of its buyers. The broad conclusion that emerges from this 
paper is that adverse-selection due to asymmetric information is reflected not only in the 
amounts of insurance purchased but, importantly, also in the choice of insurance products 
suitable for different individual characteristics. This conclusion is supported by recent 
empirical work about the UK annuity market (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)). 
JEL Code: D11, D82. 
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Regular annuities (sometimes called ￿ life-annuities￿) provide payouts, ￿xed or
variable, for the duration of the owner￿ s lifetime. No payments are made af-
ter the death of the annuitant. There are also period-certain annuities which
provide additional payments after death to a bene￿ciary in the event that the
insured individual dies within a speci￿ed period after annuitization1. Ten-year
and Twenty-year certain periods are common (see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba
and Warshawsky (2001)). Of course, expected bene￿ts during life plus ex-
pected payments after death are adjusted to make the price of period-certain
annuities commensurate with the price of regular annuities.
Period-certain annuities thus provide a bequest option not o⁄ered by reg-
ular annuities. It has been argued (e.g. Davido⁄, Brown and Diamond (2005))
that a superior policy for risk-averse individuals who have a bequest motive is
to purchase regular annuities and a life insurance policy. The latter provides
a certain amount upon death, while the amount provided by period-certain
annuities is random, depending on the time of death.
In a competitive market for annuities with full information about longevi-
ties, annuity prices will vary with annuitants￿life expectancies. Such ￿ separat-
ing equilibrium￿in the annuity market, together with a competitive market for
life insurance ensures that any combination of period-certain annuities and life
insurance is indeed dominated by some combination of regular annuities and
life-insurance.
The situation is di⁄erent, however, when individual longevities are private
information which cannot be revealed by individuals￿choices and hence each
type of annuities is sold at a common price available to all potential buyers.
This is called a ￿ pooling equilibrium￿ . In this case, the equilibrium price of each
type of annuity is equal to the average longevity of the buyers of this type of
annuity, weighted by the equilibrium amounts purchased. Consequently, these
prices are higher than the average expected lifetime of the buyers, re￿ ecting
the ￿ adverse-selection￿caused by the larger amounts of annuities purchased by
individuals with higher longevities2.
1TIAA-CREF, for example, calls these After-Tax-Retirement-Annuities (ATRA) with
Death Bene￿ts.
2It is assumed, that the amount of purchased annuities, presumably from di⁄erent ￿rms,
2When regular annuities and period-certain annuities are available in the
market, self-selection by individuals tends to segment annuity purchasers into
di⁄erent groups. Those with relatively short expected life span and a high prob-
ability of early death after annuitization will purchase period-certain annuities
(and life insurance). Those with a high life expectancy and a low probability of
early death will purchase regular annuities (and life-insurance) and those with
intermediate longevity prospects will hold both types of annuities.
The theoretical implications of our modelling are supported by recent em-
pirical ￿ndings reported in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004), who studied
the UK annuity market. In a pioneering paper (2004), they test two hypothe-
ses. One, "that higher-risk individuals self-select into insurance contracts that
o⁄er features that, at a given price, are most valuable to them". The second
is that "the equilibrium pricing of insurance policies re￿ ects variation in the
risk pool across di⁄erent policies". They ￿nd that the UK data supports both
hypotheses.
Our modelling provides the theoretical underpinning for this observation:
adverse selection in insurance markets may be largely revealed by self-selection
of di⁄erent insurance instruments, in addition to varying amounts of insurance
purchased.
2 Modelling and First-Best
Consider individuals on the verge of retirement who face an uncertain lifetime.
They derive utility from consumption and from leaving bequests after death.
For simplicity, it is assumed that utilities are separable and independent of
age. Denote the instantaneous utility from consumption by u(a); where a is
the ￿ ow of consumption, and v(b) is the utility from bequests at the level of b.
The functions u(a) and v(b) are assumed to be strictly concave, di⁄erentiable,
and satisfy u0(0) = v0(0) = 1 and u0(1) = v0(1) = 0: These assumptions
ensure that individuals will choose strictly positive levels of both a and b:
Expected lifetime utility, U, is
U = u(a)￿ z + v(b) (1)
cannot be monitored. This is a standard assumption. See, for example, Brugiavini (1993).
3where ￿ z is expected lifetime. Individuals have di⁄erent longevities represented
by a parameter ￿, ￿ z = ￿ z(￿): An individual with ￿ z(￿) is termed ￿ type ￿￿ .
Assume that ￿ varies continuously over the interval [￿; ￿ ￿]; ￿ ￿ > ￿: We take a
higher ￿ to indicate lower longevity: ￿ z0(￿) < 03: Let G(￿) be the distribution
function of ￿ in the population.




[u(a(￿))￿ z(￿) + v(b(￿))]dG(￿) (2)
where (a(￿);b(￿)) is consumption and bequests, respectively, of type ￿ indi-
viduals.
Assume a zero rate of interest, so resources can be carried forward or




[a(￿)￿ z(￿) + b(￿)]dG(￿) = W (3)
Maximization of (2) s.t. (3) yields a unique First-Best allocation, (a￿;b￿);







Conditions (3) and (4) jointly determine (a￿;b￿) and the corresponding
optimum expected utility of type ￿ individuals U￿(￿) = u(a￿)￿ z(￿) + v(b￿):
Note that while First-Best consumption and bequests are equalized across
individuals with di⁄erent longevities, U￿ increases with longevity: U￿0(￿) =
u(a￿)￿ z0(￿) < 0:




and F(T;￿) = 0; where T is maximum lifetime. Average life expectancy is ￿ z(￿) =
T R
0
F(z;￿)dz: It is assumed that ￿ z(￿) is well-de￿ned when T = 1: An increase in ￿ is taken
to reduce survival probabilities,
@F(z;￿)
@￿
< 0; for all z; hence ￿ z0(￿) < 0:
Example: F(z;￿) =
e￿￿z ￿ e￿￿T
1 ￿ e￿￿T ; which becomes F(z;￿) = e￿￿z when T = 1:
43 Separating Equilibrium
Consumption is ￿nanced by annuities (for later reference these are called ￿ reg-
ular annuities￿) while bequests are provided by the purchase of life insurance.
Each annuity pays a ￿ ow of one unit of consumption, contingent on the annuity
holder￿ s survival. Denote the price of annuities by pa: A unit of life insurance
pays upon death one unit of bequests and its price is denoted by pb: Under
full information about individual longevities, the competitive equilibrium price
of an annuity varies with the purchaser￿ s longevity, being equal (with a zero
interest rate) to life expectancy, pa = pa(￿) = ￿ z(￿): Since each unit of life
insurance pays 1 with certainty, its equilibrium price is unity: pb = 1: This
competitive separating equilibrium is always e¢ cient, satisfying condition (4),
and for a particular income distribution can support the First-Best allocation4.
4 Pooling Equilibrium
Suppose that longevity is private information and hence annuities are sold at
the same price, pa; to all individuals.
Assume that all individuals have the same income, W, so their budget
constraint is5:
paa + pbb = W (5)
Maximization of (1) s.t. (5) yields demand functions for annuities, ^ a(pa;pb;￿);



















4Individuals who maximize (1) s.t. budget constraint ￿ z(￿)a + b = W will select (a￿;b￿)





> 0: Note that W(￿) strictly
decreases with ￿ (increases with life expectancy).
5As noted above, allowing for di⁄erent incomes is important for welfare analysis. The joint
distribution of incomes and longevity is essential, for example, when considering tax/subsidy
policies. Our focus is on the possibility of pooling equilibria with di⁄erent types of annuities,
given any income distribution. For simplicity, we assume equal incomes.
6The dependence on W is suppressed.










(pb ￿ 1)^ b(pa;pb;￿)dG(￿) (7)
De￿nition 1 A pooling equilibrium is a pair of prices (^ pa; ^ pb) that satisfy
￿a(^ pa; ^ pb) = ￿b(^ pa; ^ pb) = 0:
Clearly, ^ pb = 1; because marginal costs of a life insurance policy are con-









The equilibrium price of annuities is an average of marginal costs (equal
to life expectancy), weighted by the equilibrium amounts of annuities.
It is seen from (8) that ￿ z(￿ ￿) < ^ pa < ￿ z(￿): Furthermore, since ^ a and
￿ z(￿) decrease with ￿; ^ pa > E(￿ z) =
￿ R
￿
￿ z(￿)dG(￿): The equilibrium price of
annuities is higher than the population￿ s average expected lifetime, re￿ ecting
the ￿ adverse-selection￿present in a pooling equilibrium.
Regarding price dynamics out of equilibrium, we follow the standard as-
sumption that the price of each good changes in opposite direction to the sign
of pro￿ts from sales of this good.
The following assumption about the relation between the elasticity of de-
mand for annuities and longevity will be shown to ensure uniqueness and sta-





be the price elasticity of the demand for annuities (at a given ￿):
Assumption 1. For any (pa;pb); "apa non-decreases in ￿:
We can now state:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the pooling equilibrium, ^ pa; sat-
isfying (8), and ^ pb = 1 is unique and stable.
6Proof. The solution ^ pa and ^ pb = 1 satisfying (6) - (7) is unique and




















= ^ b(^ pa;1) > 0;
@￿a
@pa
















where ^ a(pa;1) =
￿ R
￿
^ a(^ pa;1;￿)dG(￿) and ^ b(^ pa;1) =
￿ R
￿
^ b(^ pa;1;￿)dG(￿) are aggre-













(^ pa ￿ ￿ z(￿)) ^ a(^ pa;1;￿)"paa(^ pa;1;￿)dG(￿) (10)
By (6), ^ pa￿ ￿ z(￿) changes sign once over (￿; ￿ ￿); say at ~ ￿; ￿ < ~ ￿ < ￿ ￿, such

















> 0; which implies that (9) is positive-de￿nite.
Figure 1 (drawn for
@￿a
@pb
< 0) displays Proposition 1.
7Figure 1
5 Period-Certain Annuities and Life Insurance
We have assumed that annuities provide payouts for the duration of the owner￿ s
lifetime and no payments are made after death of the annuitant. We called
these regular annuities. There exist also period-certain annuities which provide
additional payments to a designated bene￿ciary after death of the insured in-
dividual, provided death occurs within a speci￿ed period after annuitization7.
Ten-year and Twenty-year certain periods are common and more annuitants
choose them than regular annuities (see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba and War-
shawsky (2001)). Of course, bene￿ts during life plus expected payments after
death are adjusted to make the price of period-certain annuities commensurate
with the price of regular annuities.
(a) Inferiority of Period-Certain Annuities Under Full Information
Suppose that there are regular annuities and X-year-certain annuities (in short,
X-annuities) who o⁄er a unit ￿ ow of consumption while alive and an additional
7TIAA-CREF, for example, calls these After-Tax-Retirement Annuities (ATRA) with
death bene￿ts.
8amount if the individual dies before age X: We continue to denote the amount
of regular annuities by a and denote the amount of X-annuities by ax: The
additional payment that X-annuities o⁄er if death occurs before age X is ￿ax;
where ￿ > 0 is the payment per X-annuity.
Consider the First-Best allocation when both types of annuities are avail-






and the resource constraint is
￿ ￿ Z
￿
[(a(￿) + ax(￿))￿ z(￿) + ￿axp(￿) + b(￿)]dG(￿) = W (13)
where p(￿) is the probability that a type ￿ individual (with longevity ￿ z(￿)) will
die before age X8: Maximization of (12) s.t. (13) yields ax(￿) = 0; ￿< ￿ < ￿ ￿:
Thus, the First-Best has no X-annuities. This outcome also characterizes any
competitive equilibrium under full information about individual longevities.
In a competitive separating equilibrium, the random bequest option o⁄ered by
X-annuities is dominated by regular annuities and life insurance which jointly
provide for non-random consumption and bequests.
However, we shall now show that X-annuities may be held by individ-
uals in a pooling equilibrium. Self-selection leads to a market equilibrium
segmented by the two types of annuities: individuals with low longevities and
high probability of early death purchase only X-annuities and life insurance,
while individuals with high longevities and low probabilities of early death
purchase only regular annuities and life insurance. In a range of intermediate
longevities individuals hold both types of annuities.










f(z;￿)dz: The typical stipulations of X-annuities are that the holder of an
X-annuity who dies at age z, 0 < z < x; receives payment proportional to the remaining
period until age X; X ￿ z: Thus, expected payment is proportional to
X Z
0
(X ￿ z) f(z;￿)dz:
In our formulation, therefore, ￿ should be interpreted as the certainty-equivalence of this
amount.
9(b) Pooling Equilibrium with Period Certain Annuities
Suppose ￿rst that only X-annuities and life insurance are available. De-
note the price of X-annuities by px
a: The individual￿ s budget constraint is
p
x
a ax + bx = W (14)
where bx is the amount of life insurance purchased jointly with X-annuities.
The equilibrium price of life insurance is, as before, unity.
For any ￿; expected utility, Ux; is given by
Ux = u(ax)￿ z(￿) + v(bx + ￿ax)p(￿) + v(bx)(1 ￿ p(￿)) (15)
Maximization of (15) s.t. (14) yields (strictly) positive amounts ^ ax(px
a;￿)
and ^ bx(px



















u(^ ax) ￿ z0(￿)+[v(^ bx+￿^ ax)￿v(^ bx)] p0(￿): We shall assume that p0(￿) > 0; which




Total revenue from annuity sales is px
a^ ax(px

























a is the equilibrium price of X-annuities. It is seen to be an
average of longevities plus ￿ times the probability of early death, weighted
by the equilibrium amounts of X-annuities. Assumption 1 regarded regular
annuities. Similarly, it is assumed that the demand elasticity of X-annuities
9Henceforth, we suppress the price of life insurance, ^ pb = 1 and the dependence on ￿:
10For example, with F(z;￿) = e￿￿z; f(z;￿) = ￿e￿￿z and p(￿) =
x R
0
f(z;￿)dz = 1 ￿ e￿￿x;
which implies p0(￿) > 0:
10increases with ￿: In addition to this assumption, a su¢ cient condition for
the uniqueness and stability of a pooling equilibrium with X-annuities is the
following:
Assumption 2. ^ px
a ￿ ￿ z(￿) + ￿p(￿) increases with ￿:
This is not a vacuous assumption because ￿ z0(￿) < 0 and p0(￿) > 0: It
states that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the pooling equilibrium,
^ px
a; satisfying (16), and ^ pb = 1 is unique and stable.
Proof. Follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 111.
6 Mixed Pooling Equilibrium
Now suppose that the market o⁄ers regular and X-annuities as well as life in-
surance. We shall show that, depending on the distribution G(￿); self-selection
of individuals in the pooling equilibrium may lead to following market segmen-
tation: those with high longevities and low probabilities of early death to pur-
chase only regular annuities, those with low longevities and high probabilities
of early death to purchase only X-annuities, and individuals with intermediate
longevities and probabilities of early death may hold both types. We call this
a ￿ mixed pooling equilibrium￿ .
Given pa; px
a; ￿ z(￿) and p(￿); the individual maximizes expected utility
U = u(a + ax)￿ z(￿) + v(b + ￿ax)p(￿) + v(b)(1 ￿ p(￿)) (17)
subject to the budget constraint
paa + p
x
aax + b = W: (18)
The F.O.C. for an interior maximum are:
u
0(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿) ￿ ￿pa = 0 (19)
u
0(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿) + v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)￿p(￿) ￿ ￿p
x
a = 0 (20)










a;￿)dG(￿) > 0: Positive
monotonicity of the price elasticity of ^ ax w.r.t. ￿ is a su¢ cient condition.
11v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)p(￿) + v
0(^ b)(1 ￿ p(￿)) ￿ ￿ = 0 (21)
where ￿ > 0 is the Lagrangean associated with (18). Equations (18) - (21)
jointly determine positive amounts ^ a(pa;px
a;￿); ^ ax(pa;px
a;￿) and ^ b(pa;px
a;￿):
Note ￿rst that from (19) - (21) it follows that
pa < p
x
a < pa + ￿ (22)
is a necessary condition for an interior solution. When the L.H.S. inequality in
(22) does not hold, then X-annuities, each paying a ￿ ow of 1 while alive plus
￿ with probability p after death, dominate regular annuities for all ￿: When
the R.H.S. inequality in (22) does not hold, then regular annuities dominate
X-annuities because the latter pay a ￿ ow of 1 while alive and ￿ after death
with probability p < 1:
Second, given our assumption that u0(0) = v0(0) = 1; it follows that
^ b > 0 and either ^ a > 0 or ^ ax > 0 for all ￿: It is impossible to have ^ a = ^ ax = 0
at any ￿:
^ a > 0; ^ ax = 0
Condition (20) becomes an inequality
u
0(^ a)￿ z + v
0(^ b)￿p(￿) ￿ ￿p
x
a ￿ 0 (23)
while (19) and (21) (with ^ ax = 0) continue to hold. From these conditions it






Denote the R.H.S. of (24) by p(￿0): Since p(￿) increases in ￿; it follows
that individuals with ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 purchase only regular annuities (and life
insurance).
^ a = 0; ^ ax > 0
Condition (19) becomes an inequality
u
0(^ ax)￿ z(￿) ￿ ￿pa ￿ 0 (25)











It is seen that at ￿ = ￿0; ’(￿0) = p(￿0): From (19) - (21) it can be
further deduced that p(￿) = ’(￿) at any interior solution (^ a > 0; ^ ax > 0):
As ￿ increases from ￿0; ^ a(￿) decreases while ^ ax(￿) increases (see Appendix).
Let ^ a(￿1) = 0 for some ￿1; ￿0 < ￿1 < ￿ ￿: From (25) and (20) - (21) it can
be seen that p(￿) ￿ ’(￿) whenever ^ a = 0 (^ ax > 0): It follows that if ’(￿)
non-increases with ￿ for all ￿ > ￿1; then all individuals with ￿1 < ￿ < ￿ ￿
will hold only X-annuities (and life insurance). We shall now state a su¢ cient
condition for this to hold.
Assumption 3. v00(x)/v0(x) non-decreases with x.
(Exponential and power functions satisfy this assumption).
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 3, all individuals with ￿1 < ￿ < ￿ ￿
hold only X-annuities.
Proof. ’(￿) non-increases in ￿ i⁄
v0(^ b + ￿^ ax)
v0(^ b)
non-decreases in ￿: Using














v00(^ b + ￿^ ax)






v00(^ b + ￿^ ax)








< 0 (see Appendix), Assumption 3 is seen to ensure that (27)
is strictly positive, implying that ’(￿) decreases with ￿:
The pattern of optimum annuity holdings and life insurance is described
schematically in Figure 2. For justi￿cation of this pattern in the three regions
I - III, see Appendix.
13Figure 2
Optimum Annuity Holdings
Equilibrium prices satisfy a zero expected pro￿ts condition for each type
of annuity, taking account of the self-selection discussed above: ￿a(^ pa; ^ px
a;1)
= ￿x
a(^ pa; ^ px
a;1) = ￿b(^ pa; ^ px
a;1) = 0: These conditions can be written (suppressing





















^ a(^ pa; ^ px
a;￿)dG(￿)
(29)
In Section 4 we stated conditions that ensure uniqueness and stability of
the pooling equilibrium. Similar conditions can be formulated to ensure this
applies to a mixed pooling equilibrium12.
12These conditions ensure that the matrix of the partial derivatives of expected pro￿ts
w.r.t. pa;px
a and pb is positive de￿nite around ^ pa; ^ px
a and ^ pb = 1:
147 Summary:
Recapitulating: in e¢ cient full-information equilibria, the holdings of any
period-certain annuities and life insurance is dominated by holdings of some
combination of regular annuities and life insurance. However, when information
about longevities is private, a competitive pooling equilibrium may support the
coexistence of di⁄erentiated annuities and life insurance, with some individuals
holding only one type of annuity and some holding both types of annuities.
Reassuringly, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) ￿nd evidence of such self-
selection in the UK annuity market. More speci￿cally, our analysis suggests
a hypothesis complementary to their observation of self-selection: those with
high longevities hold regular annuities, while those with low longevities hold
period-certain annuities, with mixed holdings for intermediate longevities.
15Appendix
Deriving the dependence of the demands for annuities and life insurance
on ￿: Maximizing (17) s.t. the budget constraint (18), yields solutions ^ a; ^ ax
and ^ b. Given our assumption that v0(0) = 1; ^ b > 0 for all ￿: Regarding
annuities, we distinguish three regards: I. ^ a ￿ 0; ^ ax = 0; II. ^ a ￿ 0; ^ ax ￿ 0 and
III. ^ a = 0; ^ ax ￿ 0:
I. ^ a ￿ 0; ^ ax = 0 (￿ < ￿ < ￿0)
u
0(^ a)￿ z(￿) ￿ v
0(^ b)pa = 0 (A.1)





















00(^ a)￿ z(￿) + v
00(^ b)p
2
a < 0 (A.4)
II. ^ a ￿ 0; ^ ax ￿ 0 (￿0 < ￿ < ￿1)
Equations (19) - (21) and the budget constraint hold:
u
0(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿) ￿ ￿pa = 0 (A.5)
u
0(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿) + v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)￿p(￿) ￿ ￿p
x
a = 0 (A.6)
v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)p(￿) + v
0(^ b)(1 ￿ p(￿)) ￿ ￿ = 0 (A.7)
W ￿ pa^ a ￿ p
x
a^ ax ￿^ b = 0 (A.8)
16(A.5) - (A.8) are four equations in ^ a; ^ ax; ^ b and ￿: The second-order con-
ditions can be shown to hold:
￿2 = ￿(u
00(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿))
2 ￿ u
00(^ a + ^ ax)￿ z(￿)[v
00(^ b + ￿^ ax)p(￿)(p
x
a ￿ pa ￿ ￿)
2 +
+v
00(^ b + ￿^ ax)p(￿)pa(p
x
a ￿ ￿) + v




+v00(^ b)(1 ￿ p(￿))papx
a] ￿ p2
av00(^ b + ￿^ ax)￿
2p(￿)v00(^ b)(1 ￿ p(￿)) < 0
(A.9)
provided px







cannot be established for all ￿ in this range
without further restrictions. However, at ￿ = ￿0; di⁄erentiating (A.5) - (A.8)













a ￿ pa ￿ ￿)u0(^ a)￿ z0(￿0)+
+(u00(^ a)￿ z0(￿) + v00(^ b)p2










































a ￿ pa ￿ ￿)v
00(^ b)u
0(^ a)￿ z
0(￿0) < 0 (A.13)
As ￿ increases from ￿ = ￿0; ^ a decreases, ^ ax increases and ^ a+^ ax decreases,
while ^ b increases.
This justi￿es the general pattern displayed in Figure 2 at ￿0: Individuals
with ￿ > ￿0 hold positive amounts of both types of annuities and, while sub-
stituting regular with period-certain annuities, decrease the total amount of
annuities as longevity decreases.
17We cannot establish that the direction of these changes is monotone at
all ￿; but we have proved the main point: generally, X-annuities are held in a
pooling equilibrium.
III. ^ a = 0; ^ ax ￿ 0 (￿1 < ￿ < ￿ ￿)
u
0(^ ax)￿ z(￿) + v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)￿p(￿) ￿ ￿p
x
a = 0 (A.14)
v
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)p(￿) + v
0(^ b)(1 ￿ p(￿)) ￿ ￿ = 0 (A.15)
W ￿ p
x
a^ ax ￿^ b = 0 (A.16)
The second-order condition is satis￿ed:
￿3 = ￿u
00(^ ax)￿ z(￿) ￿ v



















0(^ b + ￿^ ax) ￿ v















0(^ b + ￿^ ax) + p
x
av
0(^ b + ￿^ ax)] (A.19)








a ￿ ￿ > 0:
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